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Abstract— The IoT (Internet of Things) has become widely 
popular in the domestic environments. People are renewing 
their homes into smart homes; however, the privacy concerns of 
owning many Internet connected devices with always-on 
environmental sensors remain insufficiently addressed. Default 
and weak passwords, cheap materials and hardware, and 
unencrypted communication are identified as the principal 
threats and vulnerabilities of IoT devices. 
Solutions and countermeasures are also provided: choosing 
a strong password, strong authentication mechanisms, check 
online databases of exposed or default credentials to mitigate the 
first threat; a selection of smart home devices from reputable 
companies and the implementation of the SDN for the 
DoS/DDoS threat; and finally IDS, HTTPS protocol and VPN 
for eavesdropping. 
The paper concludes dealing with a further challenge, “the 
lack of technical support”, by which an auto-configuration 
approach should be analysed; this could both ease the 
installation/maintenance and enhance the security in the self 
configuration step of Smart Home devices. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The IoT (Internet of Things) has become widely popular 
in the domestic environments. People are renewing their 
homes into smart homes (Zeng, Mare and Roesner, 2017), 
adopting both “hi-tech” items (smart voice assistant, security 
cameras, fitness trackers) and classic household objects (smart 
fridges, doorbells and heating) (Ncsc.gov.uk, 2019). 
Smart-home device has been defined as “any single-
purpose Internet-connected device intended for the domestic 
usage (such as thermostat, lightening, or blood-pressure 
monitor) or a hub-like device that connects and controls 
multiple single purpose devices (e.g. a Samsung SmartThings 
hub or Amazon Alexa)” (Apthorpe, Reisman and Feamster, 
2019). 
Although they make our life easier and smarter, domotics 
and IoT raise significant privacy concerns. While, in the past, 
people’s online activity was restricted to web browsing, now, 
smart home devices’ always-on sensors transmit information 
regarding the users’ offline activities on the Internet (Apthorpe 
et al., 2019). 
As a result, “The contents, patterns, and metadata of 
network traffic, flowing from and to these IoT devices, can all 
reveal sensitive information about a user’s online activity.” 
(Apthorpe, Reisman and Feamster, 2019). This extensive 
information may be valuable in several and different contexts, 
such as advertising and business intelligence (Apthorpe et al., 
2019). 
This paper will review the impact of the IoT devices in 
homes and it will focus on the following objectives 
(Enisa.europa.eu, 2020): 
• Analysis of the implementation of IoT devices throughout 
the house and their cybersecurity challenges. 
• Mapping threats and vulnerabilities in relations to IoT 
assets and considerations of countermeasures.  
• Giving an overview of techniques which may endanger 
IoT devices. 
 
II. SECURITY VULNERABILITIES AND THREATS 
Smart home devices cannot be considered as specialised 
machines with built-in intelligence but as real computers that 
perform specialised tasks; for instance, a smart refrigerator can 
be seen as a computer which keeps track of its content and 
temperature or a smart lamp as a computer which can be 
switched on and off, remotely, by a smartphone. These tasks-
specialised devices, known as IoT, smart home devices or 
domotics, are, almost always, composed by a microprocessor, 
like a laptop, connected to the internet (Angrishi, 2017). 
Unlike specialised computers, however, IoT devices are 
very often developed and designed with a poor or even none 
security (Angrishi, 2017). 
In addition, as Rapid7 explained (Stanislav and Beardsley, 
2015), “IoT devices, unlike traditional computers, usually lack 
a proper update and upgrade patch once they leave the 
manufacturers’ warehouse”. 
In the next section, vulnerabilities and threats will be 
analysed for a generic smart home device. 
 
  
Here below, the data flow for a generic IoT device: 
 
 
 
As stressed in the above picture, the generic smart home 
device is wireless or wired connected to the internet through 
which it communicates with its cloud databases. The cloud 
hosts the data the device stores, useful for its aim (the 
refrigerator data will be the information of the inside products 
and the temperature, the light lamp data will deal with the 
actual operation of the devices and the different colouration 
of the lamp etc..). Moreover, the user interfaces with that 
device through his smartphone, connected to the internet as 
well (92% of IoT devices are controlled and regulated by a 
smartphone or laptop) (Stanislav and Beardsley, 2015). 
 
Analysing the data flow model is crucial to establish the 
different vulnerabilities and threats which affect the smart 
home system. 
 
 
Potentially, an IoT device may suffer, throughout its 
dataflow sections, the following threats: 
 
 
 
DEFAULT OR WEAK CREDENTIALS 
According to several studies (Enisa.europa.eu, 2020) 
(Stanislav and Beardsley, 2015), the most critical vulnerability 
concerning the IoT devices is default or weak credentials. 
Very often, the user, who lacks security awareness, decides to 
use default passwords or weak ones for their smart home’s 
solutions just because more likely to be remembered 
(Enisa.europa.eu, 2020). 
Even when there is a certain level of awareness, traditional 
restrictions (password length and characters impositions), 
sometimes, generate annoyance and exasperation in users 
who, then, choose to adopt insecure passwords to overcome 
these “abrasive charges” (Enisa.europa.eu, 2020). 
On the other hand, the malicious actor may be able to 
either scan the exposed devices utilising online databases of 
default credentials (Shodan or Insecam) or guess the weak 
password through dictionary or brute force attack. As a result, 
the attacker could eventually obtain the credentials, take over 
the IoT device, and, finally, use it for malicious aims, such as 
the creation of botnet (“Mirai” constitutes an example). 
Botnets are usually utilised also for DDoS (Distributed Denial 
of Service) and cryptographic attacks on different networks 
(Enisa.europa.eu, 2020). 
 
 
CLEARTEXT IN NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS 
Other studies underpinned the cleartext in network 
communications, by which remote communications may not 
be encrypted. Here, for instance, there may be many passive 
and active network attacks that can revel sensitive information 
flowing from and to these IoT devices (Stanislav and 
Beardsley, 2015). 
Almost the majority of all the Smart home devices rely on 
cloud-based systems which expose APIs from controlling 
devices over HTTP (Zeng, Mare and Roesner, 2017). As a 
result, by encompassing an unencrypted connection, all the 
packets of the internal and external communications, 
regarding the IoT device, could be potentially sniffed 
(Stanislav and Beardsley, 2015). 
 
 
CHEAP HARDWARE ELEMENTS 
Although many IoT devices present cutting-edge features 
and powerful application, especially for the home automation, 
these “machines” are usually built with cheap hardware 
elements. Therefore, cheap firmware and chips usually 
incorporate built-in vulnerabilities, difficult, even impossible, 
to detect by operators and owners. In addition, considering 
those devices which are “always-on and online” (that is to say 
that keep listening and communicating with internet), IoT is 
continually and potentially exposed to malware payloads 
(Team, 2018). 
Cheap hardware and weak firmware may be potentially 
exploitable by the Denial of Service attacks which corrupt the 
availability of the system by denying users’ access. The DoS 
attack is achieved by flooding the targeted device or network 
(where the device is hosted) with internet traffic until it 
crashes, preventing, thus, the access for the authorised users 
(Us-cert.gov, 2020). 
With the widespread of the poorly secured smart home 
devices, the number of Dos and DDoS attacks has sharply 
increased and it is estimated that almost the 20% of the IoT 
attacks finds its roots in these attacks (Crane, 2020) 
(Cloudflare, 2020). 
III. TECHNIQUES TO ATTACK 
This section will present different tools and techniques, 
used by criminals, to exploit IoT devices. 
Here below, the 3 most IoT-related threats the techniques 
are going to address to: 
 
Source references: (Veerendra, 2020) (Metula, 2020) 
Source reference: (Enisa.europa.eu, 2020) 
Source reference: (Stanislav and Beardsley, 2015) 
 
 
 
EXPLOIT IOT THROUGH DEFAULT OR WEAK 
PASSWORDS 
Almost all the IoT devices rely on an application through 
which they could monitored and/or controlled (the app for a 
Babycam, amazon Alexa, a smart fridge, washing machine 
etc..). Similarly, every app, if connected to an online account, 
asks for a username and password for the authentication. 
Moreover, usually, a username coincides with the mail. 
The attacker, hence, once found the username of the 
victim, needs his password. 
Unfortunately, many IoT products come with default 
credentials; It is, indeed, estimated that almost 15% of these 
devices present default password and settings (Ophtek, 2020). 
In this scenario, the work for the malicious actor is very 
simple: googling the name of the device being used by the 
victim. Online, there are several updated databases of any 
sort of tech products’ default passwords. The most common 
are: cirt.net, fortypoundhead.com, default-password.info, 
phenoelit.org, and open-sez.me. 
 
 
 
Differently, in case the default password has been 
changed, the attacker may only try to guess it. A brute force 
attack is any attempt to discover credentials, hidden web pages 
or keys used for the communication encryption, by using the 
“trial and error” approach and “hoping”, eventually, to guess 
correctly. Although it is a dated technique, it is still in use and 
effective. Length and complexity of passwords play an 
important role at this step: the longer the password, the less 
probable guessable (Kaspersky, 2019).  
The Daily Swing, a Cyber security newspaper, stated that 
the first primary issue is the use of weak passwords, which 
leads to several types of remote compromise (Haworth, 2020). 
Tracesecurity estimated that 81% of data breaches are 
facilitated by poor passwords (PCWorld, 2019). 
There are different Kali Linux tools for bruteforce attacks. 
The most known is Hydra, a powerful login cracker that 
supports many different protocols to attack (kali.org, 2020). 
Taking as IoT-device sample an IP smart security camera, 
the process to follow to run the attack is the following one: 
Once got access to the Wlan where the targeted device 
lays, the attacker is going to scan the network to discover its 
IP address.  
Discovered the IP address of the smart home device, the 
attacker launches Hydra command that will contain the 
address of the victim, its username and a wordlist of possible 
passwords which has been created or downloaded from online 
resources (Github is the common one also for multilingual 
wordlists). 
 
 
If the attacker is lucky and the password weak, 
credentials are found.  
 
 
DOS or DDOS 
Regarding the Denial of Service attack, it has already been 
said that can be facilitated by the cheap material of the 
hardware and software. However, every system could suffer 
such attack. 
These attacks represent quite the 25% of a country’s entire 
online traffic while they are occurring (Crane, 2019). 
Moreover, according to Gartner Inc., “IoT devices are 
notorious for lacking any real IT security or cybersecurity 
measures, therefore, they’re extremely vulnerable to DoS 
attacks” (Crane, 2019).  
A simple but most powerful tool for DOS attacks is 
Xerxes, committed on Github by Zanyarjamal (Gurubaran, 
2018). Unlike Hydra, this tool is not pre-installed on the Kali 
Linux environment. 
Xerxes, as other tools, keeps putting heavy loads on the 
HTTP server in order to exhaust its resources hence make the 
device crash. 
This technique can be applied to every system (web site, 
device, network, application), whatever nature it belongs to. 
Both online servers and devices are usually targeted by 
malicious actors to deny the availability to the victims. In the 
following demonstration, an online hacking game website will 
be used not to cause any physical damage. 
Once installed the tool, the attacker starts the attack: 
 
Once the command is executed, the system starts sending 
request through the port 80 (HTTP) to the IP or URL address 
(in this case the URL of the website Slavehack.com). 
 
 
Once saturated, the system crashes preventing, hence, the 
victim from using it. 
 
 
INTERCEPTING THE HTTP REQUESTS FROM AND 
TO THE IOT DEVICES 
Many smart home systems interface with the “external 
world” through a non-secure protocol, such as HTTP. This 
could lead to eavesdropping of the traffic between them and 
users (Enisa.europa.eu, 2020).  
The attacker sets a proxy server aimed to intercept and 
modify the HTTP requests. Proxy servers may be either a 
computer or an app hosted in the computer; it could sometimes 
also be somewhere between the online server and the client 
(Kayode and Tosun, 2018). 
The proxy server behaves as intermediary and helps to 
forward the requests of the host towards the desired target 
host. If used during HTTP communication, the proxy would 
have access to the transmitted unencrypted data. As a result, 
those devices which transmit data in cleartext will easily 
expose sensitive user’s information. The malicious actor may 
thus get access to user’s data through this method (Kayode and 
Tosun, 2018). 
Wireshark is a popular open source graphical user interface 
(GUI) tool for analysing packets within a network. This tool is 
particularly useful for (Nasi, 2020): 
 
Once opened the tool, which is pre-installed in all Debian-
base OS, the scan of the network is initiated. 
All the unencrypted communications which pass in the 
network are eavesdropped by Wireshark and all plain text 
resources are given, here below it is shown how the plain text 
credentials of this IoT device are sniffed by this tool: 
  
IV. COUNTERMEASURES  
The attacks explained in the previous section can be 
mitigated by countermeasures aimed to protect the users’ data 
and the integrity of the IoT devices. 
The principal vulnerability is the default and weak 
passwords; when it comes to choosing a strong password, 
primarily and whenever possible, it is highly recommended to 
use strong authentication mechanisms (for instance, based on 
challenge-response authentication, with an SSH signature) 
(Enisa.europa.eu, 2020). Furthermore, it is also essential to 
make sure that the authentication mechanism prevents users 
from creating weak credentials (such as keywalk passwords, 
that is, passwords based on adjacent keyboard keys, e.g. 
‘qwertyuiop’, or obvious ones, like ‘Aa12345!’). There are 
plenty of international authorities (NIST, 2020) that have 
created guidelines for this purpose, but essentially, users 
should be given freedom to be creative and create custom 
passwords that are both secure and user-friendly, without too 
many format restrictions (Enisa.europa.eu, 2020). 
Online databases of exposed or default credentials 
(https://haveibeenpwned.com/) are a good resource to avoid 
the use of weak authentication mechanisms. This would hinder 
the malicious actions of the attacker, since the tools available 
would be less effective to guess weak or default passwords 
(Enisa.europa.eu, 2020). Another recommendation is to 
implement security mechanisms like multiple-factor 
authentication for application access or mechanisms forcing to 
change or set up a new password before using the device for 
the first time (Enisa.europa.eu, 2020).  
Regarding DoS and DDoS attacks, unfortunately, “there is 
no silver bullet” (Weagle, 2020), but there are some 
precautions which should be taken to protect against them 
(Weagle, 2020). 
The selection of smart home devices from reputable 
companies which are committed to selling secure products is 
the primary tip. In addition, users should also regularly check 
for firmware updates to make sure the system is not 
compromised. (Weagle, 2020) (Enisa.europa.eu, 2020). 
A possible technical solution for these attacks is the SDN 
(Software-defined networking), a network security 
management used throughout different areas, such as, e-
health, business and smart homes as well (Tabassum and 
Lebda, 2019). 
Giotis et al. (2014) tested the capability of an SDN 
architecture to protect the IoT devices against DOS attacks. 
They found out that SDN was very efficient to detect such 
attacks and did not cause an overhead to the controller (Giotis 
et al., 2014). 
Another solution was suggested to be the IDS but this is 
going to be treated at the end of this section (Papamartzivanos, 
Gomez Marmol and Kambourakis, 2019). 
Finally, the mitigation of eavesdropping and sniffing. 
While data is transmitted from the device to the server, it 
can be hijacked. An attacker may sniff the communication 
traffic and alter it leading to serious privacy concerns. 
However, there are some possible solutions to mitigate the risk 
and protect the communication as much as possible. (Yousuf, 
Mahmoud, Aloul and Zualkernan, 2015) (Tabassum and 
Lebda, 2019). 
To mitigate both DDoS/DoS and eavesdropping, it could 
be used the IDS (Intrusion detection system) which is a 
program that manages to discover doubtful activities in a 
network environment and identify unauthorised access to the 
IoT device (Tabassum and Lebda, 2019). The IDS, although it 
is sometimes unable to detect new attacks and slow in its 
response, may eventually constitute a countermeasure against 
Cyberattacks (Papamartzivanos, Gomez Marmol and 
Kambourakis, 2019) (Tabassum and Lebda, 2019). 
As shown in the “intercepting the http request” example, 
whenever a communication uses an HTTP protocol, there is a 
possible leakage of the users’ privacy. Credentials in plain text 
are sniffed and the confidentiality exploited (Tabassum and 
Lebda, 2019). 
The primary solution is to set on those devices a security 
communication encompassing the HTTPS protocol 
(Tabassum and Lebda, 2019). Having an encrypted 
communication may defend users’ confidentiality. 
In addition, to foster the security of IoT devices, it could 
be implementing a VPN (Rottigni, 2019). 
The function of VPNs is not just encrypting data, they also 
cover users’ geographical location and IP address. Protecting 
this data helps prevent third parties, whether hackers, Internet 
Service Providers, government agencies, or others who might 
try to gather information about your activities. This means that 
other entities cannot infiltrate an IoT device and start 
eavesdropping or leaking confidential information (Rottigni, 
2019). 
VPN can, hence, protect users against different and 
common IoT-related cyberattacks: eavesdropping and botnets 
(Rottigni, 2019). 
 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE 
RECCOMENDATIONS 
The IoT (Internet of Things) has become widely popular 
in the domestic environments. People are renewing their 
homes into smart homes; however, the privacy concerns of 
owning many Internet connected devices with always-on 
environmental sensors remain insufficiently addressed. 
Throughout this paper, different threats and vulnerabilities of 
smart home devices have been found and described. Default 
and weak passwords are the primary concern while cheap 
materials and hardware and unencrypted communication 
could lead to a leakage of the integrity and the confidentiality 
of such devices.  
Solutions and countermeasures have been also provided: 
choosing a strong password, strong authentication 
mechanisms, check online databases of exposed or default 
credentials to mitigate the first threat; a selection of smart 
home devices from reputable companies and the 
implementation of the SDN for the DoS threat; and finally 
IDS, HTTPS protocol and VPN for eavesdropping. 
However, as stressed in the introduction, it is expected 
that the number of IoT devices will increase. A lack of 
technical support constitutes another big challenge for the 
smart home (Lin and Bergmann, 2016). Users “feel bothered 
by tedious, repetitive and error-prone manual tasks” for 
setting these devices and eventually fixing them. This could 
pose, indeed, a further security risk. Therefore, for a more-
secure and successful implementation of IoT devices, an 
auto-configuration approach should be analysed since it could 
both ease their installation/maintenance and enhance the 
security in the self configuration step (Lin and Bergmann, 
2016).  
The system created by Lin et al. (2016) implies that, 
whenever a new device is connected to the network, the 
gateway interrogates a trusted and secure web server, 
according to the device ID, with the aim to find the details of 
such device, e.g. its functionality, what encryption and 
networking protocols it understands or eventual firmware 
updates. Differently from others, this approach ensures, with 
just a web server and a simple device ID, availability, 
integrity, and confidentiality of the personal data (Lin and 
Bergmann, 2016).  
The topic of the next project, indeed, will be the secure 
auto-configuration approach which could lead to a “next 
generation” of IoT security. 
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